Quantum Computing Drives Shift Toward Quantum-Safe Encryption

Developments in quantum computing are prompting governments and organizations to update cybersecurity measures, as current encryption methods face new risks from quantum algorithms.

Quantum computing introduces vulnerabilities for widely used public-key cryptographic systems such as RSA and ECC, as Shor’s algorithm can efficiently solve problems that underpin these methods. Symmetric encryption is also affected, with Grover’s algorithm reducing its security margin, though not to the same extent as public-key systems.

To address these challenges, quantum cryptography techniques like quantum key distribution (QKD) and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) are being advanced. These methods are designed to provide secure communication channels and encryption that can withstand quantum attacks.

The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has published guidance calling for organizations to begin the transition to post-quantum cryptography. The guidance sets a timeline for identifying vulnerable systems by 2028, prioritizing upgrades by 2031, and completing migration by 2035.

What the numbers show

• 2035 is the target year for full quantum-safe migration set by G7 regulators
• UK NCSC guidance calls for identification of vulnerable systems by 2028
• Microsoft aims for early adoption of quantum-safe capabilities by 2029 and full transition by 2033

Major technology companies are also preparing for the shift. Microsoft announced a Quantum Safe Program Strategy that aims for early adoption of quantum-safe capabilities by 2029, with full transition planned by 2033. These timelines align with targets set by government agencies and international regulators.

International coordination is underway, with financial regulators and agencies from the UK, Canada, the US, and the EU setting 2035 as the deadline for full migration to quantum-safe encryption. Some critical systems are expected to meet earlier deadlines, often by 2030.

Hybrid encryption protocols that combine classical algorithms with lattice-based PQC, such as Kyber or SABER, are being tested in real-world environments. Examples include the use of post-quantum extensions in TLS 1.3 and pilots of quantum-secure communication networks in China, the European Union, and the United States.

Academic research is contributing to the transition by developing risk assessment frameworks for quantum communication systems and proposing adaptive security models that integrate QKD and PQC. Tools like the AQuA framework have been introduced to support the migration of legacy systems to quantum-resistant cryptography through detection, refactoring, and verification processes.

Although quantum computers do not yet have the capability to break current cryptographic algorithms as of 2026, efforts to migrate to quantum-safe cryptography are already in progress to address anticipated future threats.

* This article is based on publicly available information at the time of writing.